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Abstract 
Social discourse often considers realist foreign policy to be the most pragmatic and rational 
approach to international relations. The present research tests the widespread belief that realist 
foreign policy reflects superior reality attunement by examining its correspondence to two 
indicators of reality engagement: the amount and quality of historical knowledge and the 
presence or absence of identity-defensive biases.  In a first study I used a true/false quiz to test 
participant’s performance on a test of critical and celebratory knowledge about past US foreign 
interventions; I measured endorsement of blind and constructive orientations of American 
patriotism, and I examined the relationship of these predictors with support for realist foreign 
policy. Consistent with a “realism as ignorance” hypothesis, realist foreign policy support was 
negatively related to historical knowledge and positively related to identity defensive patterns of 
American patriotism. In a second study, I conducted an experiment in which I exposed 
participants to different sets of facts that were either critical or celebratory representations of past 
US foreign interventions and assessed the impact of this manipulation on support for realist 
policy. Inconsistent with a “realism as ignorance” hypotheses and results of Study 1, results 
reveal a biased assimilation pattern, such that participants who were high in blind patriotism 
selectively appropriated celebratory knowledge to further bolster their realist policy inclinations.  
Together, results from both studies challenge the notion of realist foreign policy as reality 
attunement. Instead, results associate realist policy preferences with ignorance and identity 
defensive forms of patriotism.  
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    Support for Realist Foreign Policy: 
Reality Attunement or Ignorance? 
Former U.S. president Richard Nixon once proclaimed that the US was the “only great 
power without a history of imperialistic claims on neighboring countries” (1994; pp.30). For 
many observers across the political spectrum, this claim lacks contact with reality. It is a claim 
that not only people in countries that have been the target of U.S. “imperialistic claims” (e.g., 
Mexico, Canada, Philippines, and Cuba), but also such explicitly expansionist leaders as James 
Buchanan, Ulysses S Grant, Andrew Jackson, James Knox Polk, and Theodore Roosevelt would 
readily dispute (Van Alstyne, 1960). What makes this lack of contact with reality interesting is 
that political observers have celebrated Nixon and his administration as champions of realist 
policy: a political paradigm whose adherents claim to practice pragmatic and fact-based policy 
assessment that allows them to see the world as it really is, without idealist or ideological 
distortions.  Nixon’s statement therefore reveals a paradox in which a paragon of political 
realism proposes a description of the international order that lacks contact with consensual 
reality. The present research considers the possibility that the paradox implicit in Nixon’s 
statement is not an isolated case. Rather than greater attunement to objective reality, realist 
policy preferences may be associated with selective ignorance of important historical facts.  
Since WW II, the politics of realism have dominated the field of American foreign 
policy. Proponents of this foreign policy paradigm observe the world as a kind of Hobbesian 
state of nature, composed of competitive and self- interested nations, where power politics is a 
natural and inevitable means by which to ensure national survival or promote maximal national 
interests. In line with this worldview, realists prefer the use of unilateral power—typically in the 
form of military force. Although realists will sometimes support multilateral policies, 
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international organizations, human rights, and other forms of international cooperation, they 
typically do so for instrumental reasons (e.g., to legitimize and advance US projection of power. 
They tend to be skeptical about the effectiveness of international cooperation for its own sake, 
which they regard as a form of naïve idealism).  
Proponents of realism are not limited to the political elite. Indeed, for at least the past 
three decades of US public opinion data, American respondents tend to be more sympathetic to 
key foreign policy components of realpolitik—especially concerning war, trade agreements, and 
broad strategic objectives—than are present-day political elites (Drezner, 2008). While discourse 
surrounding realism is more often conceived of in the context of political elite decision-making, 
public opinion appears to significantly draw upon views and rhetorical devices of political elites 
in forming and sustaining their own foreign policy attitudes (Holsti, 2004). 
In part, realism’s privileged position in US politics and public opinion owes its prestige to 
the common perception that realism is both a pragmatic and rational guide to foreign policy that 
best secures and maximizes U.S. interests. Since Machiavelli promoted the famous distinction 
between “the effective truth of things” (realism) and the “imaginary republics and monarchies that 
have never been seen or have been known to exist,” (idealism), political realists have maintained 
that ideologies of international cooperation are based on naïve and unattainable objectives that 
undermine national interests (as cited in Moravcsik, 2010, pp. 3). As one advocate put it, realism 
concerns itself “with human nature as it actually is, and with the historical processes as they 
actually take place”, rather than by “hopeful illusions about a world without conflict” 
(Morgenthau, 1960; pp. 4).  To this day, realist foreign policy prescriptions claim hegemonic 
access to objective “reality” and charge that policies that privilege international cooperation are 
out of touch with objective reality. Traditional accounts legitimate the violent, militaristic 
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practices of realist foreign policy by stressing its fidelity to the dispassionate calculation of 
objective facts while disparaging more cooperative foreign policy as naïve, wishful thinking. As 
noted by Freyberg-Inan (2004), ” to call oneself a realist, in the study of politics just as in 
common usage is to make the claim that one sees the world as it really is rather than through the 
rose-tinted glasses of idealism or through the distorting lenses of ideology. It is to make the claim 
that one is ‘objective’ in one’s interpretation of observable phenomena” (p.12).  Following from 
this construction of realist foreign policy are two associated assumptions. The first is that realism 
is attuned to objective reality. The second is that realism is above the influence of ideological or 
identity-defensive biases.  
Is it really true that realist foreign policy preferences reflect attunement to objective 
reality?  Some work has raised doubts that support for realist foreign policy has its roots in 
accurate knowledge of objective reality (Powlick & Katz, 1998) -or that idealism reflects 
impulses of  an uncultured ‘moralistic spirit’ (Kennan, 1984). Particularly when viewed among 
the general public, realist foreign policy preferences suggest that such choices reflect something 
other than reality attunement.  Drawing upon this work, the present research puts to empirical 
test the idea that realist foreign policy reflects reality attunement.  In particular, I consider the 
extent to which realist policy preferences are positively associated with a credible indicator of 
reality attunement, in the form of people’s accurate knowledge of consensual historical facts 
(Salter, 2008; Nelson, 2010). Claims to reality attunement suggest an understanding and at 
minimum a consideration of what came before it.  Realism readily implies that knowledge of 
relevant historical facts should inform present day opinions (Rosenthal & Thompson, 1991). If 
realist foreign policy preferences reflect reality attunement, then one would expect support for 
realist foreign policy to be associated with greater historical knowledge.  
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Of interest is not just quantity of historical knowledge, but also the quality of that 
knowledge. For example, support for realist foreign policy may reflect not ignorance in general, 
but instead selective knowledge of triumphant moments in the national past and ignorance of less 
triumphant moments.  
Discussions of selective or incomplete knowledge raise questions about the sources of 
that knowledge, and therefore the bases of support for realist foreign policy. If realist foreign 
policy is not about commitment to the complete accounts of history, then its basis is not 
objective facts but instead a particular quality of historical understanding in the service of 
identity concerns. That is, support for realist foreign policy may have its roots in ignorance of 
particular histories that affords a means to maintain faith in exceptional and superior conceptions 
of nation.  Accordingly, the present research considers how support for realist policy preferences 
reflects identity-relevant processes—in particular, engagement with glorifying constructions of 
American national identity—rather than superior reality attunement.  
Historical Knowledge and Support for U.S. Foreign Policy 
Across many theoretical branches of social psychology, there is converging agreement 
that collective understandings of past provide a key source of information for guiding present 
day sociopolitical attitudes and action.  
Constructions of Historical Knowledge 
Researchers in the domain of social representations theory explore how culture-specific 
intergroup historical experiences and constructions of the past serve as one precise means for 
understanding differences in people’s responses to the present. Work by Liu and Hilton (2005) 
has considered how differences in a group’s history and as a consequence alternative 
understandings of the past condition people or groups with comparable present day political 
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interests to respond in characteristically divergent ways. Moreover, as Mocovoici (1984) 
contended, recollections of history do not simply consist of inert facts about the past; instead, 
these narrations can act as historical charter both informing and legitimizing present day order of 
things.  People thus use the past and are affected by the past when acting in the present. 
  In an important way, social representations theory illuminates how peoples’ memories 
of the past are derived from systems of qualitatively different historical knowledge that 
consequently structures interpretations of the present. Significant events that make up a groups 
unique historical knowledge concern alternative understandings of conflicts (e.g. Liu et. al. 
2005).  Past research finds that memory of conflicts often engenders intense emotion, either 
positive or negative, and that these affect- laden historical representations work to regulate 
people’s behavior in the present. Paez et. al. (2008) for example demonstrated how memories of 
positive past events such as collective victory were correlated with one’s willingness to fight in 
future wars.   Indeed recalling these triumphant war histories notably reinforced people’s support 
for present day military action.  
Besides work investigating the effects that representations of historical conflict can have 
on support for current policy, another body of research considers the effects that different 
historical framing can exert on support for current policy. In a classic study, Gilovich (1981) 
presented participants with a hypothetical crisis situation that contained historical reminders of 
either World War II or the Vietnam War. He then measured their support for military 
intervention in the fabricated scenario. Results revealed the hypothesized effect of historical 
framing, such that participants expressed greater support for military intervention when materials 
framed the event in the historical context of World War II rather than the Vietnam War.  
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Schuman and Reiger (1992) found similar results in the real world example of support for 
the first Gulf War. Support for U.S. military intervention in Kuwait was greater and significantly 
related to the historical war analogy participants both preferred and chose to employ. Participants 
who perceived Saddam Hussein as similar to Adolf Hitler expressed much greater support for 
military invasion in Kuwait. In contrast, participants who drew upon comparisons to the Vietnam 
War to frame their interpretation exhibited significantly less support for U.S. military 
intervention in Kuwait.  
These findings demonstrate the powerful interpretive effects that social representations of 
World War II and the Vietnam War, as respective examples of celebratory and critical historical 
narratives, have on people’s perceptions of present day conflict. Content analyses of American 
recollections of World War II find not only that it is significantly imprinted in collective 
historical memory beyond those generations that personally experienced  it, but also that memory 
of World War II is highly associated with feelings of  patriotism, economic prosperity, and 
triumph (Scott & Zac, 1993).  Popular representations among Americans overwhelmingly 
portray World War II as the “good war”, and in free recall of the event people readily make 
mention of moralistic imperatives such as overthrowing evil forces and liberating endangered 
nations (Scott & Zac, 1993).  Conversely the Vietnam War is associated in American collective 
memory with tragedy, injustice, foreign policy failure. Some scholars refer to these 
transformational events as lessons that one can apply to present-day judgments (e.g. Mouritzen 
& Olesen, 2010).  Celebratory historical lessons about past foreign policy successes suggests 
application of a similar policies in the present. In contrast, self-critical historical lessons point to 
past foreign policy “failures” to guard against a repetition of past mistakes.  
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Measurement of Historical Knowledge 
The work that I considered in the previous section considers qualitative differences in the 
meaning or relevance of historical events that people use to interpret the past. Another body of 
work attempts to measure or manipulate familiarity with conventionally recognized historical 
“facts”. 
Cohrs and Moschner (2005) measured war knowledge by administering a true-false test 
containing “pro-war” and “anti-war” items. They then assessed the relationship between this war 
knowledge and support for the use of military force in the Kosovo War. In their test, “pro-war” 
items concerned information that was highly disseminated in mass media and capitalized on 
images of Serbian violence against the Kosovo-Albanian people. “Anti-war” items received less 
media attention and shed more critical light on the wrongdoings of NATO intervention. Results 
indicated that only greater knowledge of “anti-war” items was significantly related to opposition 
of NATO war efforts, whereas participant knowledge of “pro-war” items was unrelated to 
attitudes about the Kosovo war (perhaps due to ceiling effects, as knowledge 
justifying/supporting NATO war effort was well known among participants).  Overall, then, 
these results suggest that opposition to the war was associated with finer attunement to 
knowledge in general, rather than a bias in type of knowledge or no knowledge at all. Knowledge 
of critical items did not seem to preclude knowledge of celebratory knowledge among anti-war 
supports, thus it is less likely that anti-war support was driven by anti-war biases or a tendency to 
seek out information that confirmed one’s attitudes or beliefs against war. Rather research by 
Cohrs and Moschner (2005) suggest that anti-war attitudes were related to an objective 
consultation and awareness of various information sources.  A caveat to this interpretation is that 
the research tools did not discriminate between accurate knowledge and subjective bias or 
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guessing. In other words, one cannot know whether participants endorsed items as true because 
they were knowledgeable of the events, or whether they merely responded to facts because they 
were consistent with their pre-existing anti-war schema.  
A field experiment by Kowaleski (1994) examined whether teaching the scientific study 
of past wars could reduce militaristic attitudes among students. In his experiment participants 
took part in a 14 week college course on the topic of conflict in international affairs. The course 
focused exclusively on empirical data concerning war, and deliberately avoided topics that 
entailed discussions on the morality of warfare. Interestingly he found that most students became 
more pacifistic over the course. Specifically, they became more favorable towards the 
establishment of peace studies and more skeptical about the idea of going to war to protect 
“vital” US interests.  One significant exception to this general pattern was participants with past 
military experience, for whom indicators of pacifism decreased after the 14 week intervention. 
This study suggests that knowledge can have the effect of decreasing realist foreign policy 
support; however, the study also illuminates another key component in the psychological 
understandings of realist foreign policy preferences: identity concerns.    
Summary 
To the extent that realist foreign policy preferences reflect a greater grasp on objective 
reality, then hypothetically these preferences should also be associated with more inclusive 
understandings of history.  Instead, what the preponderance of evidence suggests is that realist 
foreign policy preferences are not necessarily associated with accurate knowledge. To the extent 
that realist foreign policy reflects ignorance or distortion of conventional historical facts, it 
suggests that both these biased accounts of knowledge and realist proclivities themselves may 
reflect identity-related motivations. 
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National Identity and Support for U.S. Foreign Policy 
The conservative international relations theorist, Samuel Huntington, contends that 
national interest lies at the heart of realist foreign policy. In turn, national interest “derives from 
national identity … the nature of the country who interests are being defined” (1997, pp.28). 
From this perspective, definitions of national interest cannot be separated from understandings of 
their socio-cultural influences. National identity undeniably evokes powerful responses 
particularly in contexts that involve international affairs.  Even beyond conscious awareness, 
national identity plays a role in how people form what appears to them as reasonable foreign 
policy assessments.  Core traits of realist foreign policy such as unilateralism are fundamentally 
grounded in notions of American exceptionalism (e.g. Holsti, 2011) and nationalist beliefs about 
American superiority. In short, one cannot adequately discuss the relationship between historical 
memory and foreign policy without also acknowledging the role of national identity (e.g. Nau, 
2002).  In fact, as Peffley and Hurwitz (1999) conclude from a comprehensive overview of 
foreign policy opinions, international attitudes are largely determined by differing orientations 
towards one’s national group. Likewise collective identity and historical knowledge exist in a 
mutually constitutive relationship (see Wilson & Ross, 2003). Experience of collective identity 
depends on understandings of the past, and understandings of the past bear the influence of 
present identity concerns.  
Blind and Constructive Patriotism 
Research that addresses the relationship between collective identity and foreign policy 
attitudes considers national identity as the primary social category by which to organize these 
attitudes. Attempts to conceptualize national identity have particularly emphasized the construct 
of patriotism. Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) define patriotism simply as “love of country”. 
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However, work on patriotism suggests that feelings of positive affect towards nation are not 
uniform in nature, but instead hinge on qualitatively different meanings of American identity.  Of 
particular interest for the present research is the distinction between blind and constructive 
varieties of patriotism. Blind patriotism is an ideological orientation that prescribes 
unquestioning loyalty to nation, an absolute attachment to national values and culture, and 
intolerance for criticism of and dissent from prevailing group ways. Constructive patriotism has 
roots in a more civic conception of identity that obligates “critical loyalty”, tolerates in-group 
criticism, and encourages dissent and questioning to effect change (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 
1999).  
Not surprisingly, past research finds that these two constructions of patriotism are linked 
to functionally divergent socio-political outcomes. Several studies show that blind patriotism is 
positively associated with nationalism, feelings of national vulnerability (Schatz et.al, 1999), 
selective knowledge seeking (Schatz et.al., 1999), social dominance orientation (McFarland, 
2005), and right wing authoritarianism (McFarland, 2005), but negatively related to support for 
civil liberties (Williams.et. al., 2008) and scores on critical thinking measures (Williams et. al., 
2008).  Constructive patriotism is positively associated with political knowledge (Schatz et.al, 
1999), political involvement (Schatz et. al., 1999), support for civil liberties (Williams et. al, 
2008), and critical thinking (Williams et. al., 2008) as well as negatively associated to support 
for policies that emphasize enhanced national security (Williams et. al., 2008).  
How are different varieties of national identification related to support for realist foreign 
policy? Implicit in the definition of “realist” foreign policy is the idea that it should be positively 
related to the critical engagement with facts (as in constructive patriotism) and negatively related 
to “blind” disregard for facts. In contrast to this implication, the connection between blind 
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patriotism and Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, 
& Sanford, 1950) implies that practices of uncritical conformity and allegiance to one’s national 
group are likely to engender feelings of heightened threat and vulnerability as well as perceptions 
of distrust toward foreign countries (Altemeyer, 1988). Correspondingly, this promotes a 
tendency to exaggerate vigilance and preparedness against impending or imagined threats, for 
example, by emphasizing enhanced national security.  Likewise the well documented 
relationship between SDO and blind patriotism, points to the relative motivation to seek in-group 
superiority and domination. As Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle (1994) indicate, this 
“hierarchy-enhancing” focus particularly strengthens support for wars that promote national 
interest and dominance, but simultaneously reduces willingness to use military force for 
humanitarian purposes.  Research that examined support for the American invasion of Iraq in 
2003 found that blind patriotism fully mediated the effects of RWA and SDO for “seeing Iraq as 
a threat” and “lack of concern for the human cost of non- Americans lives”, respectively, which 
consequently increased support for military intervention (McFarland, 2005).  
Critical Thinking and Uncritical Patriotism 
Williams et al. (2008) suggest that differences in critical thinking may help to further 
explain the oppositional perspectives of blind and constructive patriotism. To the extent that 
critical thinking increases an individual’s willingness to question American policies rather than 
blind approval and defense of them, then critical thinking seems to closely align with 
constructive patriotism and less compatible with the tenets of blind patriotism. Empirical 
evidence from the work of Williams et al. (2008) validates these relationships, finding an 
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especially strong negative relationship between critical thinking and blind patriotism, and a 
relatively weaker positive correlation between critical thinking and constructive patriotism1. 
The interconnectedness of patriotism to critical thinking raises important questions that 
concern the extent to which one’s experience of identity may suppress or advance one’s 
willingness to let evidence lead to answers on difficult questions. One might propose that 
constructive patriotism, which is conceptually similar to critical thinking, would promote a more 
self-critical collective orientation such that identity concerns do not interfere with consideration 
of new information. Evidence suggests that blind patriotism instead may advance a more self-
enhancement collective orientation, such that identity concerns play a more active role in biasing 
one’s consideration of new information, especially if it may implicate one’s identity or 
disconfirm pre-existing beliefs. 
Summary 
To the extent that realist foreign policy support reflects engagement with objective 
reality, then preferences for such policies should be aligned with constructive forms of patriotism 
that promote critical thinking and knowledge gathering as well as prevent identity defensiveness 
or enhancement from tinting one’s view of reality. Instead, what past literature suggests is that 
support for realist foreign policy preferences is more prevalent among people who endorse blind, 
uncritical forms of patriotism. To the extent that realist foreign policy support has its roots in 
patriotic orientations that are averse to knowledge and blindly follow nation, it would suggest 
that realist foreign policy support is less about attunement to reality than it is about blinding 
oneself from reality in order to perpetuate these identity patterns. 
  
                                                           
1  Williams and colleagues (2008) further suggest that improvement in critical thinking is more 
likely to reduce blind patriotism rather than further enhance constructive patriotism.  
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Present Work 
The present work examines the extent to which general public opinion in support of 
realist foreign policy preferences reflects faithful attunement to reality or biased engagement 
with reality in support of identity concerns.  Two studies examined support for realist foreign 
policy in relationship to (a) accurate knowledge of past US foreign interventions and (b) 
constructions of American national identity. Study 1 is a correlational design in which I use a 
historical knowledge quiz to measure reality attunement and predict support for idealist and 
realist foreign policy from this measure and measures of patriotism.  Study 2 is an experiment in 
which I examine the impact of different forms of historical information concerning US foreign 
interventions on support for realist and idealist foreign policy.  
One set of hypotheses under investigation concerns the relationships between accurate 
knowledge of past US foreign interventions and realist foreign policy preferences. Dominant 
understandings suggest a realism as reality attunement hypothesis: specifically, that realist 
policy preferences—reflecting beliefs in American exceptionalism and disdain for “idealistic” 
international cooperation—should be positively related to greater knowledge of past US foreign 
interventions. In contrast, past research and the preceding discussion suggest a realism as 
ignorance hypothesis: the idea that realist foreign policy preferences may in fact arise out of a 
general insensitivity to or ignorance of past US foreign policy, such that they are negatively 
related to accurate knowledge of past US foreign intervention. A third possibility suggests that 
realist foreign policy preferences do not reflect attunement to or ignorance of reality in general, 
but instead reflect particularistic understandings of the past. Specifically, this biased reality 
hypothesis suggests that realist foreign policy preferences are positively related to knowledge of 
14 
 
successful past US foreign interventions and negatively related to knowledge of more malevolent 
US foreign interventions.  
A second set of hypotheses considers the reality attunement of realist foreign policy 
preferences from the perspective of patriotic attachment. To the extent that realist policy is an 
outcome of an objective and dispassionate commitment to the facts at hand (as dominant 
representations propose), the realism as reality attunement hypothesis suggests that support for 
realist foreign policy should be negatively related to blind patriotism and positively related to 
constructive patriotism.  In this regard, realist policy would seem to reflect a disinterested 
attachment to nation such that individuals are not defensive toward negative information or 
emotionally predisposed toward positive information concerning their national in-group, but 
instead evenhandedly consider all information. In contrast, past research and the preceding 
discussion indicate that realist foreign policy preferences may not be so dispassionate or 
objective as proponents allege; instead, realist foreign policy preferences may reflect a form of 
ignorance about the facts of past American foreign policies. Accordingly the realism as 
ignorance hypothesis proposes that support for realist policy preferences will be positively 
related to blind patriotism and negatively related to constructive forms of patriotism. 
A third hypothesis concerns the interaction between historical knowledge and patriotic 
attachment.  Past research indicates that collective self-enhancement orientations such as 
uncritical patriotism lead individuals to avoid or minimize the importance of information that 
negatively implicates an in-group (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Doosje & Branscombe, 2003; 
Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2004; Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010) and to 
emphasize or exaggerate the significance of information that reflects positively on a group’s 
image (Figueiredo, Valentim, & Doosje, 2011). This implies a patriotism moderation hypothesis 
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such that the relationship between historical knowledge and realist foreign policy preferences 
will not be evident among participants who endorse high levels of blind patriotism. Instead, 
hypothesized relationships between historical knowledge and realist policy preferences may 
emerge only for participants who show little endorsement of blind patriotism, for whom effects 
of knowledge are free to operate without interference from identity-protective defenses. 
STUDY 1 
Overview  
To assess historical knowledge, national identity orientations and their relationships to 
support for realist foreign policy preferences, I adapted a procedure from research on the 
relationship between knowledge of African American history and perceptions of racism in U.S. 
society (Nelson, 2010; Salter, 2008). The key features of this procedure include (a) a historical 
knowledge quiz consisting of true and false statements about both celebratory and critical 
knowledge of events from US history, and (b) a signal detection paradigm to distinguish accurate 
knowledge from schema-driven responses. I then considered the relationships between the 
resulting celebratory and critical knowledge scores along with blind and constructive varieties of 
patriotism as simultaneous predictors of support for realist foreign policy preferences.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 73 undergraduates at the University of Kansas. All participants 
indicated American nationality. Participants designated their race/ethnicity as white/Caucasian (n 
= 68); Pacific Islander/American Samoan (n = 2), African American (n = 1), Asian (n = 1), and 
Mixed (n = 1).  
Procedure 
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I recruited participants through the introductory psychology pool at the University of 
Kansas. All participants responded to the study online through the University’s SONA system in 
exchange for one online study credit.  After providing informed consent, participants completed 
a multiple measure survey (see Appendix for a complete list of all items). All participants 
completed the study in the same pre-arranged order.  
Materials 
Each participant completed a questionnaire containing a measure of foreign policy 
beliefs, an assessment of historical knowledge related to past U.S. foreign interventions, a 
measure of Blind and Constructive Patriotism (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine, 1999), and 
demographic items (including political identification from 0 [extremely conservative] to 10 
[extremely liberal], race, and previous residency outside the United States). 
Foreign policy attitudes. The measure of foreign policy beliefs was a 15-item 
questionnaire (see Appendix). Participants responded to these items with a 5-point Likert scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Three items referred to specific cases of current 
realist, unilateral foreign policy intervention (e.g. “The U.S. should unilaterally decide how long 
to keep troops in Afghanistan in order to secure American interests.”). I combined these items 
into an a priori Specific Realist Intervention index (α=.50).  
I subjected the remaining 12 items to an exploratory principal component factor analysis. 
Although three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 emerged, a scree plot suggested a one- 
factor solution. I then performed another factor analysis in which I constrained the solution to 
one factor (Table 1).  The seven items that loaded on positively referred to protection of U.S. 
interests and security at the expense of international cooperation (e.g. “When provoked by 
serious engagement the U.S. should act in its interest and not worry about foreign sovereignty”). 
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The remaining 5 items, which loaded on the factor negatively, assessed support for “idealist” 
foreign policies relating to U.S. cooperation with the UN and/or international community (e.g., 
“The U.S. should comply with U.N. demands to investigate credible reports of violations of the 
‘UN Convention against Torture’ that occurred during the Iraq War”). The scale reliability for 
this solution was strong (α = .81), therefore suggesting that indeed realist foreign policy and 
idealist foreign policy represent opposite ends of a bipolar internationalism spectrum.  I 
conducted subsequent analyses using a single composite score of realist and idealist policy 
support termed Realist Policy Preferences. For this measure I reverse coded all idealist foreign 
policy items, such that higher scores on this factor represented greater support for realist foreign 
policies in comparison to idealist policy support.   
History Quiz. To measure knowledge of past U.S interventions, participants completed a 
‘true-false’ quiz (see Appendix), consisting of two sets of 10 statements each. One group of ten 
items referred to past U.S. foreign policies with outcomes that I portrayed in a positive or 
benevolent light. The remaining items referred to past U.S. foreign policies with outcomes that I 
portrayed in a negative or malevolent light. Participants first indicated whether the history 
statement was true or false. Then they used a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (guessing) to 5 (certain) 
to indicate their level of confidence for each respective ‘true-false’ response. Of these 
statements, 12 items were ‘true’—that is, contained only information for which there is strong 
expert consensus—while the remaining 8 items were ‘false’. The 12 true items included 6 of 
positive valence (e.g., “1948 The United States enacts the Marshall Plan, a plan to rebuild 
Europe which had been devastated by war.”) and 6 of negative valence (e.g., “1970’s  US 
President Richard Nixon orders a bombing campaign of neutral Cambodia.”). The 8 false items  
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included 4 of positive valence (e.g. “1979 The United States Congress approves a large scale 
financial aid package, the African Educational Fund (AEF), which provides $50 billion to 
improve education across Africa.”) and 4 of negative valence (e.g. “1964  The United States rigs 
the Portuguese elections allowing the U.S. supported candidate to win. The opposition candidate 
Hugo Silva is forced into exile). 
Patriotism. Participants also responded to an 18-item version of the Blind versus 
Constructive Patriotism (Schatz et. al., 1999) using a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly 
disagree) to 5(Strongly Agree)2 .  Rather than viewing patriotism as a monolithic construct, this 
                                                           
2 The original Blind versus Constructive Patriotism is composed of 19 items (Schatz et al., 
1999); however, due to experimenter error, I failed to include one item: “I believe that the U.S. 
policies are almost always the morally correct ones”.  The omission of this item did not appear to 
affect the reliability of the blind patriotism scale (α=.87), which is comparable to the original 
(α=.88; Schatz et al., 1999). 
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scale identifies alternative means by which people can experience and express affective 
attachment to country. Blind patriotism refers to an unquestioning allegiance or positive 
evaluation of one’s country and an intolerance of criticism against one’s nation (e.g. “The United 
States is virtually always right;” α =.87). Constructive patriotism indicates an approval for 
beneficial criticism that is rooted in both affective attachment to one’s homeland, but also 
aspirations for positive change (e.g. “If I criticize the United States, I do so out of love for my 
country;” α =.74).   
Results 
I report analyses using data from only those participants who indicated “white or 
Caucasian” as their racial/ethnic identity. I also excluded participants who had lived outside of 
the United States for more than 6 months. This left a sample of N = 67.  
Historical Knowledge  
I analyzed participants’ quiz responses using a signal detection paradigm in order to 
gauge their knowledge of factual U.S. foreign interventions while accounting for arbitrary 
guessing and biases (Nelson, 2010; Salter, 2008). The important parameters in signal detection 
theory are hits and false alarms. A hit occurs when a participant indicates a history item as ‘true’ 
when it is indeed true. A false alarm occurs when a participant indicates a history item as ‘true’ 
when in fact it was false. The hit rate and false alarm rate refer to the proportion of items 
participants reported as “true” out of the total number of actual true items (hits) or actual false 
items (false alarms). Because I was interested in confident knowledge that participants held with 
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some conviction (even if they were wrong), I only counted “true” responses (whether hits or 
false alarms) if participants indicated “true” with certainty of 3 or greater3. 
I computed hit rates and false alarm rates for the two different sets of history knowledge: 
celebratory knowledge and critical knowledge. The celebratory history score and critical history 
score pertained to the 10 positive historical facts and 10 negative historical facts respectively. I 
then used these hit rates and false alarm rates to calculate discrimination indices for each set of 
history knowledge. The discrimination index (d') refers to a participant’s overall ability to 
correctly distinguish true items as true without incorrectly believing false alarms to be true. I 
used the formula d' = probit (hit rate)- probit (false alarm rate) to calculate d' scores for 
celebratory and critical sets of knowledge. I also created an index of criterion(C) which measures 
participants’ standard of response. I used the formula c = -1/2(probit[hitrate]+ probit [false alarm 
rate]) to calculate criterion measures for both celebratory and critical sets of knowledge. Positive 
scores indicated that participants applied stricter standards when responding true or were more 
conservative in their endorsement of items. A negative C score indicated the application of more 
liberal criteria when endorsing an item as true. Descriptive statistics (Table 2) indicate that 
historical knowledge of past U.S. foreign interventions was relatively low. Participants’ 
knowledge about celebratory past foreign interventions (M= .41, SD= .28) was greater than their 
knowledge about more malevolent instances of U.S. foreign policy (M=.22, SD=.20), for which 
participants tended to endorse false and true statements indiscriminately. A paired-samples t-test 
confirmed that the difference between celebratory knowledge scores and critical knowledge 
scores was significant, t = -3.79, p < .001. 
 
                                                           
3 I also computed knowledge scores without the incorporation of certainty information. Trend of 
results do not change when confidence criteria is excluded, however relationships are weaker. 
21 
 
 
Relationships between Variables 
Bivarate zero-order correlations between dependent variables revealed several interesting 
relationships (Table 3). Blind patriotism was positively related to support for specific realist 
interventions (r=.52, p <.001) and more generally, realist policy preferences (r=.74, 
p<.001).Constructive patriotism was not correlated with either of the foreign policy measures. 
These findings are consistent with previous research suggesting that blind patriotism, but not 
constructive patriotism, is positively related to support for military-driven defense of U.S. 
interests (e.g. McFarland, 2005;Williams et. al., 2010; Khatib & Huddy, 2007). 
 
 
Historical Knowledge and Foreign Policy Attitudes 
To test primary hypotheses, I used an OLS regression model with political identification, 
blind patriotism, constructive patriotism, critical knowledge (d'), and celebratory knowledge (d') 
as simultaneous predictors of policy attitude dimensions. Although I was mostly interested in 
exploring main effects for historical knowledge and constructions of patriotism on foreign policy 
attitudes, I did include two theoretically important interaction effects in these analyses: the 
interactions between blind patriotism and separate indicators of critical and celebratory 
knowledge4. To accommodate the incorporation of interactions, I mean centered all knowledge 
measures and blind patriotism. 
                                                           
4 In preliminary analyses, I also included interactions between constructive patriotism and 
knowledge measures. These analyses did not reveal significant main effects or interactions 
involving constructive patriotism, so I do not include them in the analyses that I report here. 
Exclusion of these effects from the model did not change relationships among other variables. 
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Specific Realist Interventions. The first regression analysis for the index of support for 
specific cases of realist, unilateral intervention revealed only a significant relationship of blind 
patriotism, β = 0.48, t(67) = 3.89, p < .001, and a marginally significant relationship for accurate 
knowledge of critical US foreign interventions, β = -0.21, t(67) = -1.91, p = .061 (see Table 
4).  Celebratory knowledge of positive U.S. interventions was unrelated to support for such 
intervention. The interactions between blind patriotism and either of the knowledge scores 
(critical and celebratory) were also not significant. 
Overall, this pattern of results is most consistent with the “realism as ignorance” 
hypothesis. Support for the realist policy of unilateral intervention in Afghanistan, Iran, and 
Pakistan was positively related to blind patriotism and negatively related to accurate knowledge 
about past U.S. foreign interventions, particularly those of a “critical” variety. Results do not 
provide support for the “biased reality” hypothesis. Accurate knowledge of celebratory items did 
not predict support for intervention. Indeed, the relationship was in the opposite direction 
(although not statistically significant). If anything, the trend was that accurate knowledge of 
celebratory history was also associated with opposition to intervention.  
Realist Foreign Policy Preferences. The first regression analyses for the index of 
support for the more general measure of realist foreign policy preferences revealed a significant 
relationship for celebratory knowledge (d') and blind patriotism.  Celebratory knowledge 
negatively predicted scores on realist foreign policy preferences β= .21, t(67)= 2.52, p=.015, 
such that familiarity with celebratory history was  related with relatively less support of realist 
militant foreign policies than idealist internationally cooperative policies. In line with previous 
results, blind patriotism positively predicted participants’ scores on the measure of realist policy 
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preferences, β = .74, t(67) = 7.60, p < .001 (see Table 5). Inclusion of interaction terms in this 
model revealed no additional effects. 
 
Discussion 
Results of Study 1 provide no support for the “realism as reality attunement” hypotheses. 
Across all measures, realist foreign policy preferences were negatively related to knowledge of 
all types of history. Results also provide no support for the “biased reality attunement” 
hypothesis. Critical and celebratory knowledge did not show opposite-direction relationships to 
realist policy preferences; instead, both types of historical knowledge were associated with 
opposition to realist foreign policy. Instead, evidence of two sorts points to the “realism as 
ignorance” hypothesis. The first source of evidence is the negative association between historical 
knowledge and support for realist foreign policy. The second source of evidence is the strong 
pattern of positive relationship between blind patriotism and support for realist policy, which 
suggests a lack of concern for the reality-correspondence of realist policy. 
Implications of Historical Knowledge 
One modification to the general statement of results is that it was knowledge of 
celebratory history, rather than overall knowledge, that showed the strongest negative 
relationships with support for realist policy. Previous work suggests that different qualities of 
historical knowledge might matter differently in predicting people’s foreign policy attitudes. For 
example, past research suggests that knowledge of collective-implicating, guilt-inducing 
historical facts can play a powerful role both in challenging status quo and shaping perceptions 
of current events in way that knowledge of collectively glorifying, celebratory history does not 
(eg.,Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Kurtis, Adams &, Yellowbird, 2010). Results of the present 
study deviate from this general trend of past research.  
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While both types of knowledge were negatively related to support for realist foreign 
policy, accurate knowledge of celebratory interventions was more influential. One important 
reason for this may be that participants on average had significantly greater knowledge of 
celebratory foreign interventions than of critical foreign interventions. Results from the present 
study indicate that participants in general are very poorly informed about critical history facts, 
thus restricting the degree of interpretation one can make regarding the relationships between 
critical history knowledge and policy support.  In any case, the fact that celebratory knowledge 
was unrelated to realist policy preferences provides strong evidence against the idea that these 
preferences have a foundation in accurate historical knowledge of any kind. In other words it is 
not that support for realist foreign policy is rooted in a more success oriented, “pro-American” 
set of consensually documented facts. Rather, support for realist foreign policy is NOT rooted in 
any form of consensually documented knowledge  
One important limitation to these results, nonetheless, entails the very low overall 
historical knowledge scores among participants as well as the significant disparity in accurate 
knowledge of critical historical knowledge compared with celebratory historical 
knowledge.  Although participants seemed relatively competent at recognizing celebratory 
knowledge, they were just as likely to believe in the occurrence of negative foreign interventions 
that never really happened as they were the occurrence of negative foreign interventions that 
actually did happen. An unfortunate consequence of participants’ poor performance on the 
measure of critical historical knowledge is that it places a limit on interpretations one can make 
with regards to its influence on foreign policy support. 
 Given participants’ poor performance, especially on knowledge of critical history, one 
might argue that items selected for the knowledge test were too challenging. The inclusion of 
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difficult items was a deliberate feature of the design to ensure that high knowledge scores 
represented active engagement with history rather than more passive consumption of knowledge 
typical of mainstream worlds. In other words, I selected items to measure confident and 
critically-attuned knowledge of history.  
A related issue concerns the relevance of items on the history quiz as indicators of 
important historical knowledge. Although I selected items from popular history texts (e.g., Zinn, 
2002; 2003), one might argue that the items selected for the knowledge test were too obscure or 
irrelevant. From this perspective, it remains possible that support for realist policy is related to 
some form of consensually documented historical knowledge that I have not assessed in this 
study. However, the current study provides no indication of what sort of historical knowledge 
this might be. What the present study does suggest is that the issue is not valence of facts, as 
knowledge of celebratory history was negatively associated with support for realist foreign 
policy. 
In any case, a cultural psychology analysis emphasizes that issues of relevance are not 
neutral judgments of historical causation. Instead, these judgments are subject to the same 
identity-relevant motivations as knowledge of history (Kurtis, Adams &, Yellowbird, 2010) . I 
return to this issue of motivated knowledge in the concluding sections of the paper.  
 Another direction for future research is to replicate this study in a sample that has greater 
knowledge in this domain, such as political science graduate student or undergraduate students in 
international relations classes. Another interesting sample to consider are military officers and 
military officer candidates. Although one might expect that these men and women have 
extensive knowledge concerning history of U.S. foreign interventions, the more interesting 
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question is how they negotiate this historical knowledge in a micro-cultural context that affords 
the performance of particular forms of national identity.   
Implications of Blind Patriotism 
Constructions of American national identity were a second set of variables of interest in 
this study. According to past research, different forms of attachment such as blind and 
constructive patriotism appear to have differing implications for how people manage reality. 
Blind patriotism suggests a disregard for reality in order to preserve positive conceptions of 
one’s national group. Conversely constructive patriotism implies a more critical attachment to 
nation, such that individuals are not interested in concealing their nation’s faults as much as they 
are remaining vigilant for these faults, so as to both correct them and prevent their 
recurrence.  Therefore, to the extent that these forms of national attachment imply opposing 
positions toward historical knowledge, they provide another means by which to assess reality 
attunement of realist and idealist foreign policy.   
The current study evaluated two competing hypotheses--the “realism as reality 
attunement” hypothesis and “realism as ignorance” hypothesis—that predict opposite 
relationships between support for realist foreign policy and levels of blind patriotism.  Results 
revealed that blind patriotism was positively related to realist foreign policy preferences. This 
provides support for the “realism as ignorance” hypothesis. But the current study found no 
evidence for the “realism as reality attunement” hypothesis.  
Constructive patriotism was unrelated to support for any type of foreign policy. Huddy 
and Khatib (2007) propose that the lack of relationship between constructive patriotism and 
conceptually related phenomenon may be due to the unidirectional format of the constructive 
patriotism scale. All items on the constructive patriotism scale are positively worded, which 
27 
 
introduces the possibility of an acquiescence bias. Also because items seem agreeable and 
pleasing to the average participant, frequent responses of accord may be due to social desirability 
effects.  Further analyses of participant’s responses from my study do appear to show evidence 
of a ceiling effect for the constructive patriotism scale (M=3.94 SD=.45) that is not evident in the 
responses to the blind patriotism scale (M=2.55, SD=.65).  In any case, observed relationships 
between blind patriotism and realist foreign policy provide strong evidence against the idea that 
realist approaches to U.S. foreign policy reflect any form of reality attunement. 
An important limitation of Study 1 is that it relies on a correlational design; accordingly, 
this study does not provide insight into causal relationships between historical knowledge and 
foreign policy attitudes. To better understand causal effects of historical knowledge, I designed a 
second study  in which I manipulated historical knowledge and tested its effects on policy 
support.  
STUDY 2 
Overview 
In an extension of Study 1, Study 2 proposed a manipulation of historical information 
concerning past US interventions and measured its effects on policy support.  Specifically, I 
investigated the effects of exposure to differing accounts of past US foreign interventions on 
realistic foreign policy preferences regarding present US foreign policy interventions.  Past 
research often distinguishes the differing impact of celebratory and critical historical accounts 
(Salter, 2010). Celebratory history, which is often infused with positive, success-oriented 
narratives about past US foreign policy, is likely to strengthen feelings of national pride and 
perceptions of realist foreign policy as a generally good and necessary mechanism for 
conducting international relations (e.g. Gilovich, 1981). Some question the function of 
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celebratory history, which is less about learning the lessons of history, and more concerned with 
justifying and preserving present day practices (e.g. Rosa, 1994; Mouritzen & Olesen, 2010). In 
contrast, because critical history rehearses past failure and wrongdoing, it makes people aware of 
their participation in collective injustice and thus obliges them to consider a change course so as 
not to repeat the mistakes of the past. In addition to effects of differing historical accounts, I also 
considered the effects of patriotism on policy support, both in terms of main effects as well as 
plausible moderating effects on participants’ openness to influence from different accounts of 
historical information.  
The first set of hypotheses again considers the influence of historical information on 
foreign policy beliefs. The “realism as reality attunement” hypothesis suggests that exposure to 
historical information concerning past US foreign policy will increase support for realist foreign 
policy perspectives that emphasize unilateral “exceptionalism” and suspicion of international 
cooperation. In contrast, the “realism as ignorance” hypothesis suggests that exposure to this 
same historical information will decrease support for realist foreign policy perspectives. Finally, 
the “biased reality attunement” hypothesis suggests that exposure to critical history will decrease 
support for realist foreign policy perspectives, whereas exposure to only celebratory history will 
increase support for realist foreign policy perspectives. 
The second set of hypotheses again considers the relationship between patriotism and 
foreign policy support.  Parallel to Study 1, the “realism as reality attunement” hypothesis, 
suggests that support for realist policy will be positively related to constructive patriotism, but 
negatively related to blind patriotism. In contrast, the “realism as ignorance” hypothesis suggests 
that realist policy support will be negatively related to constructive patriotism and positively 
related to blind patriotism.  
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Finally the “patriotism moderation” hypothesis again suggests that patriotism may 
moderate the effects of historical exposure on people’s policy opinions. Specifically, this 
hypothesis proposes that the relationship between historical knowledge and realist foreign policy 
preferences will not be evident among participants who endorse high levels of blind patriotism 
and are relatively impervious to the impact of the historical knowledge. Instead, hypothesized 
relationships between historical knowledge and realist policy preferences may emerge only for 
participants who express low levels of blind patriotism, for whom the effects of knowledge are 
free to operate without interference from identity-protective defenses. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 93 undergraduates at the University of Kansas. All participants indicated 
American nationality. 87 participants designated that their race/ethnicity as white/Caucasian; 5 
participants indicated that they were a black or African American. Other responses included 
mixed (n=1), Asian (n=3), Native American (n=1) and Hispanic (n=2).  
Procedure 
I recruited participants through the introductory psychology pool at the University of 
Kansas. All participants completed the study by responding to a written survey in exchange for 
course credit. A white male research assistant administered the study to participants. After 
obtaining informed consent, the research assistant randomly assigned each participant to one of 
three conditions consisting of different versions of a history fact recognition task. After 
participants completed the manipulation, they then proceeded to complete the same U.S. foreign 
policy attitudes and patriotism questionnaire as in Study 1.    
Materials 
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Historical Fact Manipulation.  The three versions of the historical fact recognition task 
each included 12 statements about historically documented occurrences from 20th century U.S. 
history (see Appendix). Participants indicated their degree of familiarity which each statement on 
5-point Likert scale (1=not at all certain; 5= absolutely certain). The first version or condition 
served as the control while the other two versions included items about either positive or 
negative past U.S. foreign interventions. In the control condition participants read 12 statements 
about U.S. history that were silent about U.S. foreign policy or intervention (e.g. “In 1993 
President Clinton signs ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policy into law regarding homosexuals serving 
in the military”).  For the second, celebratory condition, I replaced six statements from the 
control condition with six items that referred to celebratory cases of past U.S. foreign policy 
efforts (e.g. “In 1948 The United States enacts the Marshall Plan, a plan to rebuild Europe which 
had been devastated by war.”).  In a third, negative condition I replaced six statements from the 
control condition with six true historical facts that conveyed harmful or malevolent instances of 
past U.S. foreign policy (e.g. “During the 1970s US President Richard Nixon orders a bombing 
campaign of neutral Cambodia.”). 
Foreign Policy. Each participant completed the same 15-item foreign policy attitudes 
questionnaire used in Study 1.  Similar to Study 1, I created an a prori, 3-item composite score 
for specific realist intervention (α=.66) that referred to specific cases of unilateral, realist 
intervention. I then ran a confirmatory factor analysis on the remaining 12 items to compare, and 
if needed adjust, the factor model from Study 1. In an unconstrained principal component 
analysis with varimax rotation, three factors with eigenvalues above 1.0 emerged; however the 
scree plot again recommended a one-factor solution (α=.75). Accordingly, results support the 
construct validity of the one-factor solution. 
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Patriotism. Each participant completed a 17 item Blind versus Constructive Patriotism 
(Schatz et. al.,1999) consistent with Study 1, except that participants rated items on a scale from  
-2 (Strongly Disagree) to 2 (Strongly Agree). Reliability of the composite scores (blind 
patriotism: α= .87; constructive patriotism: α=.72) were also compatible with Study 1. 
Results 
In order to assess relationships between measured variables I computed the correlation 
coefficients for blind and constructive patriotism and the six foreign policy dependent measures. 
The results of this correlation analysis appear in Table 6. Bivarate correlations suggest that blind 
patriotism is strongly correlated with all factors relating to realist foreign policy including the 
realist intervention(r=.61, p<.001) and realist policy preferences(r=.58, p<.001). Similar to 
Study1, there were no significant relationships between constructive patriotism and support for 
any type of foreign policy. 
 Group means and standard deviations as a function of experimental condition appear in 
Table 7. A simple one-way ANOVA indicated that only responses to the specific realist 
intervention measure differed significantly across conditions, F (2, 85) = 4.64, p=.012.  
 In order to assess hypothesized effects across conditions and moderating effects of blind 
patriotism, I conducted multiple regression analyses. In order to run multiple regression analyses 
with the 3-level, historical knowledge factor, I used dummy codes of (0,1,0) and (0,0,1) to 
represent control, celebratory, and critical history conditions, respectively. The first “celebratory 
code” isolates the effect of the celebratory history condition. The second, "critical code” isolates 
the effect of the critical history condition.  To create an interaction term between blind patriotism 
and historical conditions, I mean-centered blind patriotism. For each set of hierarchical multiple 
regressions, I first tested relationships of hypothesized predictors (i.e. historical condition, 
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identity, and political ideology) with the each dependent measure. I then examined the higher 
order interaction of historical condition with blind patriotism.5 
Specific Realist Interventions   
The multiple regression analysis of Specific Realist Intervention (which indicates support 
for realist, unilateral intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) revealed significant effects 
of blind patriotism, β= .55, t=5.53, p<.001, celebratory history, β=.24, t=2.41, p=.018, and 
critical history, β=.24, t=2.34, p=.022 (see Table 8). Consistent with the “realism as reality 
attunement” hypothesis, the main effects of historical condition indicated that exposure to both 
critical and celebratory history significantly increased the realist foreign policy pattern of support 
for current or ongoing military interventions relative to accounts that were silent about past U.S. 
foreign interventions. In contrast, and consistent with the “realism as ignorance hypothesis”, the 
main effect of blind patriotism locates the basis of realist foreign policy preferences in uncritical 
allegiance to country and disregard for facts that might inform foreign policy. The interaction 
terms were not significant. 
Realist Foreign Policy Preferences 
The multiple regression analysis for the general measure of realist foreign policy 
preferences  revealed only a significant main effect for blind patriotism, β= .49, t=4.93, p<.001, 
such that uncritical allegiance to country predicted increased realist foreign policy 
preferences(see Table 9).  In this case, the interaction model revealed a significant interaction of 
blind patriotism and celebratory representations, β = .43. t= 3.82, p <.001. 
                                                           
5 Preliminary analyses revealed no effects of constructive patriotism or its interaction terms with 
historical condition. As a result, I again omitted these variables from the models that I report in 
this paper. Results remain unchanged if one includes constructive patriotism in the analyses. 
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To interpret this interaction, I used an online tool (Preacher, Curran & Bauer, 2006) to 
regress the measure of realist foreign policy preferences on blind patriotism separately across 
historical knowledge conditions (comparing the celebratory history condition to the other two 
conditions). A visual representation of the interaction appears in Figure 1. Regions of 
significance analysis reveals an effect of the celebratory condition on realist policy preferences 
that was significant only among participants who endorsed high levels of blind patriotism (i.e. 
greater than .14 or 0.40 standard deviation above the mean).Among participants who scored high 
in blind patriotism, scores on the measure of foreign policy preferences were higher among 
participants in the celebratory history condition than the other two conditions. There was no such 
effect among participants who scored low in blind patriotism, for whom scores on the measure of 
realist foreign policy preferences were typically.           
Discussion 
The purpose of Study 2 was to consider how exposure to different forms of historical 
knowledge affects people’s foreign policy opinions. In this experiment, I set in opposition two 
hypotheses: the “realism as reality attunement” and “realism as ignorance”. Results provided 
support for neither of these hypotheses; instead, results provide qualified support for a third 
“biased reality attunement” hypothesis. Consistent with this hypothesis, celebratory knowledge 
was associated with greater support for realist policy. However, there was no evidence that 
exposure to critical history had the opposing effect of decreasing support for realist intervention. 
Moreover, this pattern emerged only for participants who scored high in blind patriotism. 
Results for blind patriotism were particularly interesting. Consistent with the “realism as 
ignorance” hypothesis and results of Study 1, blind patriotism was strongly correlated with 
realist policy preferences. This pattern links realist policy preferences to a stance of indifference 
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toward or disinterest in factual information about the consequences of past U.S. foreign policy. 
Results also revealed that blind patriotism moderated the effect of historical knowledge on 
support for realist policy positions. Although this might seem at first glance to provide support 
for the “patriotism moderation” hypothesis, the particular character of this moderation effect was 
different from the hypothesized pattern that originally informed the present research. The 
original moderation hypothesis proposed that the effect of the manipulations would be seen only 
among those low in blind patriotism. Instead the results find that the manipulation only had 
significant effects among participants who endorsed high levels of blind patriotism. Contrary to 
the hypothesis of blind patriotism as form of unthinking cognition that is unresponsive to 
knowledge manipulations, this pattern suggests that people who are high in blind patriotism are 
responsive to knowledge, particularly when that knowledge supports pre-existing policy 
inclinations. That is, participants who endorsed high levels of blind patriotism appeared to 
selectively respond to the celebratory knowledge to legitimize and strengthen their pre-existing 
realist policy leanings.  This pattern is reminiscent of a biased assimilation effect (Lord, Lepper 
& Ross, 1979) and suggests that blind patriotism may act as mode of motivated cognition.  
Apart from this biased assimilation or appropriation effect among participants who 
endorsed high levels of blind patriotism, the historical knowledge manipulation generally failed 
to produce effects on realist policy preferences—specifically, decreased support for realist policy 
perspectives—that one might anticipate based on results of Study 1. An explanation for this 
unintended finding may be due to brevity of the manipulation. Such a short exposure to history 
facts seemed to trigger an identity-defensive reaction against assimilation of those facts, rather 
than an attunement of one’s responses to the implications of those facts. Unlike past research that 
demonstrated opinion-altering effects of critical history, the current study only found identity-
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enhancing effects for celebratory history among participants with already strong identity relevant 
opinions. Opinion-altering effects of critical history might require more engaging, intense 
exposure to information over a longer period of time than one has in a half-hour 
experiment. Previous research highlights the importance of cultural engagement through which 
historical information can develop contextual meaning and practical utility.  A classroom setting, 
for example is one environment that has been conducive to testing and understanding the 
learning effects of historical knowledge (see Phillips, 2011). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
At least since WWII, realism has remained one of the most venerable approaches to 
foreign policy in United States. Mainstream accounts privilege realist foreign policy for its 
ostensible objectivity and attunement to reality. In contrast, the theoretical foundation for the 
present research suggests that the tendency for Americans to support realist foreign policy does 
not reflect sober assessment of and attunement to relevant facts, but instead reflects ignorance of 
relevant facts. Drawing on this theoretical foundation, the primary purpose of the present 
research was to investigate the overarching hypothesis that differences in support for realist 
foreign policy reflect differences in knowledge concerning past U.S. foreign interventions.  
The first study provided the primary test of hypotheses regarding the relationships 
between policy support and reality engagement.  Results supported the guiding hypothesis that 
support for realist foreign policy is negatively associated with indicators of reality attunement or, 
alternatively stated, is positively associated with ignorance of relevant facts.   
The second study was less closely aligned with the primary research question. Instead, it 
extended the focus of Study 1 to consider the process by which people manage, maintain, and 
reproduce systems of historical knowledge to preserve existing identity structures.  Results 
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indicated that exposure to celebratory knowledge increased support for realist policy among 
individuals who endorsed high levels of blind patriotism. Responding to exclusive schemas of 
information and not others, results from Study 2 contributes more broadly to the notion of how 
people may come to know about and reproduce representations of knowledge that emphasizes 
celebratory and positive pasts but leave out historical information that is critical or threatening.  
Given that certain orientations of identity moderate this process also suggest that this process is 
not accidental but entails an “intentional” component that is embedded in the identity structures. 
Contradictory Findings? 
At first glance the studies appear to tell two different stories about the role of historical 
knowledge. Study 1 indicates that historical knowledge decreases realist foreign policy 
preferences, but Study 2 suggests that among people who subscribe to uncritical forms of 
patriotism historical knowledge can instead be used to sponsor realist foreign policy preferences. 
Additionally Study 1 suggests that knowledge and blind patriotism are unrelated in their effects 
on policy support, while Study 2 finds an interaction effect between historical knowledge and 
blind patriotism on policy support. Two bodies of work that help to resolve these seemingly 
contradictory patterns of results include cognitive research on knowledge depth and the cultural 
psychology theory of mutual constitution. 
Depth of Knowledge  
A possible resolution of the apparent inconsistency across the two studies concerns the 
form in which historical knowledge enters the research design. In particular, the historical 
knowledge under consideration across the two studies differs along the dimension of depth. 
Study 1 measured deep historical knowledge that participants held with some conviction by 
using signal detection paradigm. In contrast, the manipulation of historical knowledge in Study 2 
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does not address the issue of depth. That is, it does not distinguish between people who are 
viewing historical facts for the first time and people who possess an enriched mental context in 
which to place these facts. Such a distinction is important not only because it indexes depth of 
knowledge processing, but also because it has implications for appropriation of this knowledge 
in critical thinking and decision making. 
 Support for these observations concerning implications of knowledge depth comes from 
research that distinguishes between deep level knowledge and shallow knowledge. Deep level 
knowledge involves comprehension of material that a person has thoroughly processed, 
structured and stored in memory in way that makes it available for application, critical judgment, 
and evaluation (e.g., Marton & Saljo, 1976; Glaser, 1991). Deep level knowledge entails sincere 
understanding of domain such that one is able to reason and explain it in causal terms as well as 
consider it from multiple perspectives (Snow, 1989). By contrast, shallow knowledge is 
associated with rote memorization and regurgitation, trial and error, and a lack of critical 
evaluation that makes it less useful and applicable across a broad range of situations (Glaser, 
1991). To the extent that historical knowledge is not sedimented into structured networks of 
meaning, people are unlikely to apply it, in critical judgments concerning US foreign policy.  
Mutual Constitution of History and Identity 
Another perspective that provides a sense of consistency across the two studies is the 
cultural psychology idea of mutual constitution (Shweder, 1990).  Out of concern for conceptual 
clarity, the theoretical basis that guided the present research focused attention on independent 
contributions of historical knowledge and blind patriotism. However, the mutual constitution 
perspective directs attention to the extent to which historical knowledge (i.e., “culture”) and 
blind patriotism (i.e., self/identity) make each other up and are therefore interrelated in their 
38 
 
effects on policy support.  Drawing on this framework, one can understand each study as an 
investigation of the different paths in the bidirectional process of mutual constitution.  
Study 1 aligns closely with socio-cultural constitution of psychological experience 
direction of the mutual constitution framework. This study considers how historical knowledge, 
as a form cultural influence, “promotes” particular patterns of policy support, somewhat 
irrespective of a person’s pre-existing identity profile.  In this direction historical knowledge as 
product of one’s cultural engagement leads individuals towards different views of reality that 
may result in different policy opinions.   
An exclusive focus on this direction of the mutual constitution process is incomplete to 
the extent that it treats cultural realities—in this case, historical knowledge—as an exogenous 
variable unaffected by identity concerns. This exclusive focus neglects the extent to which 
systems of historical knowledge (and other aspects of cultural reality) are themselves the product 
of human action, informed by the identity concerns of the people who produce them. In other 
words, an exclusive focus on effects of historical knowledge neglects the equally important, 
complementary process in the mutual constitution framework, the psychological constitution of 
reality. An examination of this process provides a framework for understanding how patterns of 
identity orientations such as blind patriotism that are grounded in self-enhancement motives push 
people to favor historical accounts that further boost these identity patterns (while discounting or 
silencing those accounts that challenge their identity-based beliefs). Results from Study 2 reveal 
how particular identity profiles moderate the engagement and incorporation of historical 
knowledge and its implications for resulting foreign policy preferences.  
Following from the mutual constitution framework, another point that merits further 
attention is the interaction of patriotism and history learning. Reporting on extensive qualitative 
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analyses of patriotism instruction and school history among young students across several 
nations, Carrtero (2011) describes an essential tension between two kinds of history instruction. 
One kind of history instruction aims for cognitive and educational enrichment and emphasizes an 
understanding of history in a complex manner. The other kind of history instruction prioritizes an 
identity-building project that promotes unquestioned positive affect towards one’s country and 
almost familial identification with its past. Carrtero’s (2011) further notes that the celebratory 
and romanticized nature of patriotic history is not only psychologically appealing to youth, but it 
is also effective in its ability to strengthen emotive and uncritical attachment to nation. Before 
children receive their first formal history lesson, they are already indoctrinated in the rituals of 
patriotic expression that are often festive and emotionally-involving, which contribute to their 
psychological efficacy. Carrtero’s research finds that the effects of devoted attachment to 
country produced by these early patriotic practices can often present challenges for learning 
history among youth.  More than just producing loyal patriotism, this faithful commitment and 
love of country impose a particular interpretive framework through which individuals 
accordingly engage the past and the present. Under this lens, people are more likely to view 
national history not necessarily as it actually happened, but through transposing concepts from 
their patriotic development, they suppose their country’s history in a seemingly logical deduction 
of facts that tend to privilege positive evaluations of one’s nation and national group (Carrtero, 
2011).  
From this perspective, patriotic development takes place through careful and targeted 
organization of historical knowledge that stimulates the formation of positive, emotional bonds 
to nation and national in-group.  Once this identity orientation is set in place, it provides the 
foundation to comprehend history in identity-enhancing ways that reproduce positive 
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constructions of identity. The instruction of historical knowledge, whether it is aimed toward 
romanticized goals or cognitive developmental goals, bears implications on identity experience 
and orientation- whether it is to become a more blindly patriotic expression of national identity 
or on a more civic conception of national identity. More substantially, the particular goals of 
history instruction can affect one’s ability to reason through the past in perceiving and making 
important policy judgments in the present  
Broader Implications 
The present research also makes several important intellectual contributions. Two that  I 
discuss here include the (un)realistic basis of realist foreign policy support and the “blind” nature 
of blind patriotism.  
How real is realist policy?  
The first and most straightforward implication concerns the question that motivated the 
research: How much do realist foreign policy preferences reflect attunement to reality? The 
answer appears to be “not very much.” Results of Study 1 provide strong empirical evidence to 
contest historically-bound notions of realist foreign policy as attunement to objective reality. 
Consistently realist foreign policy support stood in opposition to two indicators of reality 
engagement, historical knowledge and identity orientations, thus making a strong case to suggest 
that the foundation of realist policy does not lie in careful consideration of facts.    
Despite the connotations of the “realism as ignorance” hypothesis, it is unlikely that 
people who prefer realist policy are completely ignorant of history. This raises an important 
clarification. The theoretical perspective that informs the present research suggests that one 
understand ignorance not as the absence or a lack of knowledge, but rather as a form of 
knowledge itself. The entanglement of identity related concerns in present research, for example, 
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furnishes evidence for this interpretation of prescriptive ignorance. People produce systems of 
knowledge that provide them tools for not knowing.  
An important task for future work is to uncover what Charles Mills (1997) referred to as 
“epistemologies of ignorance”. Rather than conceive of ignorance as an innocent, unintentional 
void in knowledge this concept emphasizes that ignorance is a kind of knowledge:  a way of 
knowing that obscure knowledge or awareness of threatening information. By averting people 
from the lessons of critical history but not celebratory history, identity orientations such as blind 
patriotism that are based on staunch loyalty to nation appear to exemplify this notion of 
prescriptive ignorance. Blind patriotism affords individuals the tools to “blind” themselves from 
reality and while believing that they remain loyal to nation. 
Certainly if people were to come to terms with America’s long record of foreign 
misconduct—perhaps because cultural tools afforded the possibility of seeing this history in an 
undefensive manner—then many reasonable individuals might likely adopt less uncritical, 
jingoistic forms of patriotism. As I have suggested, ignorance of historical knowledge is not 
without purpose, but may be necessary to the function and performance of particular identities 
and policy preferences.  From this perspective, people may use “blindness” as a strategic tool to 
advance preferred policies and preferred experiences of identity. 
How blind is blind patriotism?  
A second implication of the research concerns conceptions of blind patriotism. Implicit in 
the definition of the construct is a conception of blind patriotism as an unthinking type of 
attachment to nation. In contrast, results of the present research suggest that individuals who 
report blind attachment to country may in fact engage in motivated and selective judgments of 
historical facts to which they are exposed. While participants who endorsed high levels of blind 
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patriotism were unresponsive to information about critical history that was inconsistent with their 
existing beliefs and desires (e.g., about superiority of the U.S.), their foreign policy beliefs were 
quite responsive to historical information that was consistent with their existing beliefs and 
desires about the US. Such patterns of response appear to reflect active and partial reasoning that 
dispel a simple understanding of blind patriotism as indifference to knowledge.  
Indeed, evidence from Study 2 suggests that the patterns of response for participants who 
endorsed high levels of blind patriotism resemble biased assimilation processes. On one side of 
the biased assimilation process, an active disregard of information that threatens prior beliefs is 
evident in the tendency for people who endorse high levels of blind patriotism to ignore 
information about past US wrongdoings when forming their foreign policy opinions. On the 
other side of the biased assimilation process, a ready acceptance of information that confirms 
one’s prior beliefs is evident in the tendency for people who endorse high levels of blind 
patriotism to report especially strong support for realist policy perspectives after exposure to 
celebratory historical knowledge. Even though people who score high in blind patriotism tend to 
support realist policy perspectives, analyses indicate that just a brief exposure to celebratory 
history facts affords them expression of even more support for realist foreign policy. Given that 
celebratory history signals information that is consistent with blindly patriotic sentiments of 
American superiority and morality, results indicate that the presentation of these historical 
statements results in active assimilation as well as polarization of prior attitudes.  
Certainly this pattern of results is telling about how blind patriotism affects the use of certain 
kinds of historical knowledge to sponsor preferred policies. Referring back to the perspective of 
epistemologies of ignorance also helps to understand how indifference for particular types of 
facts is grounded in identity orientations such blind patriotism. To the extent that not knowing 
43 
 
and indifference leads to greater support for realist policies, then blind patriotism and the 
systems of not knowing it encourages also bear serious implications for the persistence of realist 
foreign policy in US international relations. 
     Perpetuation of conflict under realist policy 
Among other reasons, the determination of whether realist policy has its foundation in 
attunement to objective indicators of reality is important because the realist world view has 
pernicious consequences. As far back as the ancient Greek empire, realist politics have kept the 
world in constant state of war against itself. Realist foreign policy has become a defining quality 
of how the United States conducts international politics, and to quite an extent it has developed 
into a prominent feature of American identity. War and military might espoused by realist 
foreign policy is well established in the fabric of American culture to the extent that backing out 
of an opportunity to express military pre-eminence makes Americans feel weak and vulnerable 
(Harris & Botticelli, 2010). As President Clinton (1993) mentioned in an address to the nation, 
“from the first days of our Revolution, America’s security has depended on the clarity of this 
message: Don’t tread on us”. When national interests are at risk, Americans see violence and 
militarism as effective foreign policy tools, but see cooperative internationalism (especially 
negotiations with countries perceived as culturally distant and dangerous), as a signal of 
weakness, idealism, or naiveté ( Payne,1995). 
To the extent that the present research challenges the reality attunement of realist foreign 
policy, it prompts, reconsideration of the influence of foreign policy realism in American 
international relations and holds the potential for reduction of unnecessary conflict. However, 
reducing the influence of realism in American foreign policy will be difficult, as it requires a 
redefinition of American interests and constructions of American identity that are not obsessed 
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with global advantages or overly threatened by perceived feelings of vulnerability. It also 
requires destabilization of knowledge systems that prevent Americans from knowing realistic 
portrayals of their past. As one US foreign policy expert argues, it is only by “changing 
America’s separatist self-image, which divides America too sharply from the rest of the world 
and forces a trade-off between international cooperation and American power” (Nau, 2002; pp. 
59) that we might curb American propensities for realist foreign, reduce destructive conflict, and 
encourage a more cooperative and just international order.    
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Appendix 
Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 Realist intervention subscale. 
1.  The U.S. should consider military options if Iran continues to defy international requests for 
transparency of its nuclear program. 
2.  U.S Armed Forces based in Afghanistan should have power to conduct cross-border raids into 
Pakistan, despite the objections of the Pakistani government, in order to meet military objectives. 
3.  The U.S. should unilaterally decide how long to keep troops in Afghanistan in order to secure 
American interests.  
 Realist policy preferences subscale. 
 Realist items. 
1.   It is okay for American Government to engage in covert operations for the sake of American  
security, even if these actions violate international law. 
2.  It is okay for the U.S. government to use enhanced interrogation techniques to gather 
potential life-saving intelligence (even if international law bans the use of these techniques). 
3.  The U.S. should intervene in the internal affairs of other countries to make sure that political 
groups sympathetic to U.S. interests gain power there. 
4.  The United Nation should be reformed to bring it more in line with U.S. interests. 
5.  The U.S. should be empowered to ignore international law or to infringe on the sovereignty of 
other nations when it relates to national security. 
6.  Terrorism imposes new challenges that require military options outside of the current legal 
framework. 
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7.  When  provoked by serious engagement the U.S. should act in its interest and not worry about 
foreign sovereignty.  
 Idealist items. 
1. America should participate in the global nuclear disarmament effort.  
2.  The U.S. should comply with UN demands to investigate credible reports of violations of the 
"UN Convention against Torture” that occurred during the Iraq war.  
3.  The U.S. should endorse U.N. proposal for a world criminal court, and should cooperate and 
submit with its decisions even when the U.S. may disagree with them. 
4.  The U.S. should change policy to more effectively cooperate with the international 
community and U.N.  
5.  The U.S. should become a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC)  to deter 
deplorable human rights abuses around the world, even if it means that  U.S. citizens must 
submit to its judgments.  
 Excluded Items.  
 The original questionnaire contained 20 items.  One “Democratic Nation-building” item  
was removed prior to analyses  because of possible confounding effects of ongoing events 
surrounding the Arab spring. Preliminary analyses were conducted with two additional aprori 
measures which included a 2 item” Multilateral Intervention” index (α=.70) and a 2 item “Israel 
Foreign Policy” index (α=.55). Because of inconsistent findings, low alpha levels, and lack of 
clarity, I excluded results from the formal document.     
 Democratic nation-building item. 
1. The U.S. should not try to impose its vision of democracy on other countries  
  
53 
 
Multilateral intervention. 
1.  The U.S. should only take military intervention measures when supported by a coalition of 
nations (e.g. NATO). 
2.  The U.S. should only engage in military interventions that are backed by the United Nations 
general assembly. 
 Israel foreign policy. 
1.  The U.S. should influence the Israeli government to lift its 3 year blockade of the Gaza strip, which 
(according to the U.N.) has caused ”‘massive’ violations” of human rights” against the 1.5 million 
Palestinians living there. 
2.  The U.S. should exert greater pressure on Israel to halt recent settlement construction in the 
West Bank and East (Arab) Jerusalem, which the U.N. has declared illegal under international 
law. 
History Quiz. 
1.   1967  The United States uses chemical warfare to destroy Bangladeshi crops in an attempt to 
destabilize the communist friendly government.  T    F    CERTAINTY ___ 
2.   1954  Following pressure from the United Fruit Company, the US Central intelligence 
agency orchestrates the overthrow of Guatemala’s democratically elected President.  T    F    
CERTAINTY ___ 
3. 1948 The United States enacts the Marshall Plan, a plan to rebuild Europe which had been 
devastated by war.   T    F    CERTAINTY ___ 
4.   1970’s  US President Richard Nixon orders a bombing campaign of neutral Cambodia.    T    
F    CERTAINTY ___ 
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5. 1963  -The United States military intervenes in Haiti to help the democratically elected 
government repel and attack by communist forces from Cuba.   T    F    CERTAINTY ___ 
6. 1946 The United States signs the Treaty of Manila with the Philippines. The treaty 
recognizes the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines and relinquishes any American 
claims over the islands.     T    F    CERTAINTY ___ 
7. 1964 The United States rigs the Portuguese elections allowing the U.S. supported candidate 
to win.  The opposition candidate Hugo Silva is forced into exile.   T    F    CERTAINTY ___ 
8. 1989 Following intense political pressure from the United States, in particular President 
Reagan, the East German government and the Soviet Union agree to tear down the Berlin 
Wall.   T    F    CERTAINTY ___   
9. 1953 US stages a coup within the nation of Iran deposing the then Prime Minister Dr. 
Mohammed Mossadegh.   T    F    CERTAINTY ___ 
10. 1984  -Former US President Ford and Carter engage in the first diplomatic mission to the 
People’s Republic of China.  T    F    CERTAINTY ___ 
11. 1973 -The U.S. government supplies support for the overthrow of the democratically elected 
government of Salvador Allende in Chile.  T    F    CERTAINTY ___ 
12. 1990-91 U.S. leads forces to liberate the country of Kuwait. Kuwait an American ally had 
been invaded by Iraqi forces in 1990     T    F    CERTAINTY ___ 
13. 1983  United States President Ronald Regan orders the invasion of the island nation of 
Grenada.     T    F    CERTAINTY ___ 
14.   1978 U.S. President Carter hosts secret meetings at Camp David with the Presidents of 
Egypt and Israel; the result of these meetings is the signing of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. 
T    F    CERTAINTY ___ 
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15. 1996  -U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright meets with both North Korean President 
Kim Jong Il and South Korean President Kim Young-sam in their respective countries to 
diffuse escalating tensions arising from military operations being performed close to the 
border by North Korea.    T    F    CERTAINTY ___ 
16.   1984 In an attempt to destabilize that Sandinista government in Nicaragua the United States 
illegally places mines in Nicaraguan harbors.  T    F    CERTAINTY ___ 
17.  1992 The United States unilaterally imposes an embargo against Haiti based on Haiti’s 
support of  Cuban proposals for hemispheric sovereignty before the United Nations.  T    F    
CERTAINTY ___ 
18.  1979 The United States Congress approves a large scale financial aid package, the African 
Educational Fund (AEF), which provides $50 billion to improve education across Africa.    .    
T    F    CERTAINTY ___ 
19.  1997  After completing his college education in the USA, Charles Taylor attends the CIA 
“School of the Americas” where he receives military and guerilla training. Taylor then 
returns to his home country of Liberia and takes over as the brutal head of state.  T    F    
CERTAINTY ___ 
20.  1994-95 U.S. led NATO forces intervene in the Bosnian War in and bring an effective stop 
to the escalating ethnic cleansing and war crimes.    T    F    CERTAINTY __ 
Blind versus Constructive Patriotism  
 1. People who do not wholeheartedly support America should live somewhere else.  
2.  The United States is virtually always right. 
3.   I would support my country right or wrong.  
4. The anti-Vietnam war protesters were un-American.  
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5.  For the most part, people who protest and demonstrate against U.S. policy are good,      
upstanding, intelligent people.  
6.  I believe that U.S. policies are almost always the morally correct ones. 
7.  If another country disagreed with an important United States policy that I knew little        
about, I would not necessarily support my country's position.  
8.    People should not constantly try to change the way things are in America.  
9.   I support U.S. policies for the very reason that they are the policies of my country.  
10. There is too much criticism of the U.S. in the world, and we its citizens should not criticize it.  
11.  It is un-American to criticize this country.  
12.  We should have complete freedom of speech even for those who criticize the country. 
13.  Because I identify with the United States, some of its actions make me feel sad.  
14.  People should work hard to move this country in a positive direction.  
15.  If you love America, you should notice its problems and work to correct them.  
16.  If I criticize the United States, I do so out of love for my country.  
17.  I oppose some U.S. policies because I care about my country and want to improve it. 
18.  I express my love for America by supporting efforts at positive change.  
19.  My love of country demands that I speak out against popular but potentially destructive 
policies. 
History Facts (Control Condition) 
1.  In 1959,  Alaska and Hawaii became the 49th and 50th U.S. states. They were the final two 
states admitted to the Union. 
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2. 24th Amendment passes in 1964.  It prohibiting both Congress and the states from 
conditioning the right to vote in federal elections on payment of a poll tax or other types of 
tax 
3. On January 31, 1958  Explorer I, the first U.S. satellite is launched into space. It is the first 
satellite to successfully orbit  the earth, and the first spacecraft to detect the Van Allen 
radiation belt. 
4.  Appointed by President Ronald Regan,  Sandra Day O'Connor becomes first woman on the 
U.S. Supreme Court on July 7, 1981.  
5. On April 20, 1999, two teenage students murder 13 other students and teachers at Columbine 
High School. It is the deadliest mass murder at a high school in U.S. history. 
6. In 1993 President Clinton signs 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' policy into law regarding 
homosexuals serving in the U.S. military  
7. On September 18th , 1947 the United States Air Force was formed as a separate branch of the 
military under the National Security Act of 1947 
8. Wal-Mart is founded by Sam Walton in 1962. It is the world’s largest public corporation, 
largest grocery retailer in the United States, and largest private employer. 
9.   December 1,1955, Rosa Parks refuses to give up her seat to white passenger on the public 
city bus in Montgomery, Alabama.  
10. In Dallas, TX, on November 22, 1963, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated by Lee 
Harvey  
11.  January 15, 1967, the first Super Bowl was held at the Memorial Coliseum in Los Angeles, 
California. The Green Bay Packers defeated the Kansas City Chiefs, 35 to 10. 
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12. May 17, 1954, Brown v. Board of Education, declares racial segregation in schools is 
unconstitutional.  
History Facts (Celebratory Condition) 
1.  From 1994-1995, U.S. led NATO forces intervene in the Bosnian War in and bring an 
effective stop to the escalating ethnic cleansing and war crimes 
2. 1990-1991 U.S. leads forces to liberate the country of Kuwait.  Kuwait an American ally had 
been invaded by Iraqi forces in 1990 
3.  In 1948 the United States enacts the Marshall Plan, a plan to rebuild Europe which had been 
devastated by war. 
4.1978 U.S. President Carter hosts secret meetings at Camp David with the Presidents of Egypt 
and Israel; the result of these meetings is the signing of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. 
5.1989 Following intense political pressure from the United States by President Reagan in 
particular, the East German government and the Soviet Union agree to tear down the Berlin 
Wall 
6. The United States signs the Treaty of Manila with the Philippines in 1946. The treaty 
recognizes the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines and relinquishes any American 
claims over the islands. 
History Facts ( Negative Condition) 
1.  The U.S. government supplies support for the overthrow of the democratically-elected 
government of Salvador Allende in Chile on 11 September, 1973 
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2. Following pressure from the United Fruit Company, the US Central intelligence agency 
orchestrates the overthrow of Guatemala’s democratically-elected President. The operation 
lasted from late 1953 to 1954. 
3.   In 1983 United States President Ronald Reagan orders the invasion of the island nation of 
Grenada. This act was condemned by the United Nations General Assembly as a violation of 
international law.  
4.  During the 1970s US President Richard Nixon orders a bombing campaign of neutral 
Cambodia. 
5. On August 19, 1953 US stages a coup within the nation of Iran deposing the then Prime 
Minister Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh. 
6. In an attempt to destabilize that Sandinista government in Nicaragua the United States 
illegally places mines in Nicaraguan harbors. The U.S. government also supplies arms to the 
Contra rebels in attempts to overthrow the Sandinista government leading to the Iran-Contra 
scandal. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Exploratory Factor Analysis of Realist and Idealist Foreign Policy Items. 
Items Factor 
Loading  
 
The U.S. should be empowered to ignore international law or to infringe on the sovereignty of 
other nations when it relates to national security. 
 .72 
 The U.S. should change policy to more effectively cooperate with the international community 
and U.N. 
 .66 
U.N. should be reformed to bring it more in line with U.S. interests.  .64 
The U.S. should become a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to deter 
deplorable human rights abuses around the world, even if it means that U.S. citizens must 
submit to its judgments. 
-.63 
The U.S. should comply with UN demands to investigate credible reports of violations of the 
‘UN Convention against torture’ that occurred during Iraq War. 
-.60 
Terrorism imposes new challenges that require military options outside of the current legal 
framework. 
 .58 
It is okay for U.S. government to use enhanced interrogation techniques to gather potential life 
saving intelligence (even if international law bans the use of these techniques).  
 .56 
  It is okay for American Government to engage in covert operations for the sake of American 
Security, even if these actions violate international law. 
 .56 
When provoked by serious engagement the U.S. should act in its interests and not worry about 
foreign sovereignty. 
-.54 
The U.S. should endorse U.N. proposal for world criminal court, and should submit with its 
decision even when the U.S. may disagree with them. 
-.49 
American should participate in the global nuclear disarmament effort -.41 
 The U.S. should intervene in internal affairs of other countries to make sure that political 
groups sympathetic to U.S. Interests gain power there. 
 .28 
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Table 2.Means and Standard Deviations for Measured Variables 
 
  
 Measured Variables  Mean SD 
Critical Knowledge Hit Rate 0.22 .20 
Critical Knowledge False Alarm Rate 0.21 .15 
d' Critical Knowledge  .66 .66 
Criterion Critical Knowledge .53 .44 
Celebratory Knowledge Hit Rate 0.41 .28 
Celebratory Knowledge False Alarm 0.29 .20 
d' Celebratory Knowledge  0.38 .66 
Criterion Celebratory Knowledge 0.43 .65 
Political Orientation 5.09            2.46 
Blind Patriotism 2.55 .65 
Constructive Patriotism 3.94 .45 
Specific Realist Intervention  3.23  
Realist Policy Preferences 2.78  
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Table 3. Pearson Correlation between all Study Variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. d' Critical         
2. d' Celebratory .17        
3. Criterion Critical     -.34**  .76       
4. Criterion Celebratory -.18 -.37***                  .50***      
5. Political Orientation -.14 -.15 -.10 .17     
6. Blind Patriotism .15  .14 .05 .06 -.35*    
7. Constructive Patriotism -.06 -.04 .01 -.04 -.02 .36**   
8. Realist Intervention -.13 -.06 .07 -.08 -.30Ϯ    .52*** -.17  
9.Realist Policy     .40 -.10  .17  .09 -.39*    .74*** -.20 .63** 
  Note: ***p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05  
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Table 4. Regression Model for Specific Realist Intervention 
 
Model and Predictors B SE β t p 
Main Effects Model 
(Constant) 10.44 .52  20.06 .000 
Blind Patriotism 1.48 .38 .48 3.89 .000 
Constructive Patriotism -0.08 .51 -.02 0.15 .879 
Political Orientation -0.01 .01 -.18 -1.54 .129 
d' Critical -0.62 .32 -.21 -1.91 .061 
d' Celebratory -0.31 .28 -.12 -1.10 .276 
Interaction Model 
(Constant) 10.51 .53  19.91 .000 
Blind Patriotism 1.47 .38 .48  3.83 .000 
Constructive Patriotism  -0.06 .51 -.02 -0.11 .914 
Political Orientation -0.02 .01 -.20 -1.68 .098 
d' Critical -0.51 .34 -.17 -1.50 .139 
d'  Celebratory -0.39 .30 -.15 -1.33 .189 
d ' Critical x Blind Patriotism  0.46 .45 .12 1.03 .307 
d' Celebratory x Blind Patriotism -0.37 .47 -.09 - 0.80 .428 
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Table 5. Regression model for realist foreign policy preferences 
 
Model and Predictor B SE Β t p 
Main Effects Model 
Constant 2.94 .11  26.82 .000 
Blind Patriotism 0.60 .08 .74 7.60 .000 
Constructive Patriotism 0.06 .11 .05 0.53 .587 
Political Identification 0.00 .00 -.14 -1.53 .132 
d' Critical -0.04 .07 -.05 -0.61 .545 
d' Celebratory -0.15 .06 -.21 -2.52 .015 
Interaction Model 
Constant  2.93 .11  26.19 .000 
Blind Patriotism 0.60 .08 .74 7.43 .000 
Constructive Patriotism 0.06 .11 .05 0.53 .596 
Political Identification 0.00 .00 -.14 -1.50 .141 
d' Critical -0.04 .07 -.05 -0.61 .543 
d' Celebratory -0.14 .06 -.21 -2.36 .022 
d' Critical x Blind Patriotism 0.02 .09 .02 0.20 .844 
d' Celebratory x Blind Patriotism 0.06 .10 .05 0.57 .570 
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Table 6. Pearson Correlation among Measured Variables 
 
 1 2 3 4 
1.  Political Orientation     
2.  Blind Patriotism       -.52**    
3.  Constructive Patriotism  -.16 -.17   
4.  Specific Realist Intervention -.35      .61** .06  
5.  Realist Policy Preferences -.37     .58** -.03 .68** 
Note: ** p<.001, * p<.01, Ϯ p<.05 
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Table 7. Measured Variables by Historical Condition Means and Standard Deviations. 
 
Factors Control Celebratory Critical 
 (n= 26) (n=28) (n=33) 
Political Orientation 4.50(2.40) 4.11(2.23) 4.42(2.33) 
Blind Patriotism -0.40(.92) -0.19(.79) -0.06(.83) 
Constructive Patriotism 1.44(.44) 1.45(.47) 1.39(.57) 
Specific Realist Intervention -0.01(.83) 0.57(.87) 0.62(.86) 
Realist Policy Preferences -0.29(.35) -0.01(.68) -0.17(.58) 
Note: Cells contain means (and standard deviations) for each group. 
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Table 8. Regression Model for Specific Realist Intervention 
 
Model and Predictors B SE β t p 
Main Effects Model 
(Constant) .31 .21  1.51 .135 
Political Orientation  -.02 .04 -.05 -.53 .596 
Blind Patriotism .58 .10 .55 5.53 .000 
Critical Code .43 .18 .24 2.34 .022 
Celebratory Code .46 .19 .24 2.41 .018 
Interaction Model 
(Constant) .34 .21  1.59 .116 
Political Orientation -.02 .04 -.05 -.50 .619 
Blind Patriotism .66 .16 .63 4.04 .000 
Critical Code .42 .19 .23 2.23 .029 
Celebratory Code .44 .19 .23 2.30 .024 
Critical Code x Blind Patriotism -.09 .21 -.05 -.401 .690 
Celebratory Code x Blind Patriotism  -.17 .23 -.08 -.74 .464 
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Table 9. Regression Model for Realist Policy Preferences 
 
Model and Predictors B SE Β t p 
Main Effects Model 
(Constant) -0.15 .27  -0.54 .592 
Political Orientation -0.05 .05 -.11 -1.012 .314 
Blind Patriotism 0.63 .14 .49 4.53 .000 
Critical Code -0.10 .25 -.05 -0.42 .676 
Celebratory Code 0.34 .25 .15 1.36 .178 
Interaction Model 
(Constant) -0.30 .26  -1.17 .248 
Political Orientation -0.06 .05 -.12 -1.24 .219 
Blind Patriotism 0.16 .20 .12 0.79 .429 
Critical Code -0.01 .23 -.01 -0.03 .978 
Celebratory Code 0.42 .24 .18 1.80 .076 
Critical Code x Blind Patriotism 0.43 .26 .20 1.66 .100 
Celebratory Code x Blind Patriotism  1.07 .28 .43 3.82 .000 
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Figure 1. Interaction between Blind Patriotism and Historical Condition on Support of 
Realist Policy Preferences 
 
  Note: Regions of significance lie outside red dotted lines. 
